Silicon, < 99.99%

Primary uses. aluminium alloy casting; silicones chemical production; semiconductors; solar cells.

The chain — from the ground to the buyer

A critical material passes through distinct stages, and the country that leads each stage is often different — that gap is what this atlas exists to show. Each layer comes from a different public source with its own vintage, labelled below; shares are % of the world total.

● Reserves — where it could come from

Reserves are the deposits known to exist and economically worth mining — the long-run ceiling on supply, distinct from what is actually produced today. USGS does not publish country-level reserves for silicon — typically because it is a by-product of another ore or is drawn from an effectively unlimited source (e.g. quartz, seawater), so a national reserve map does not apply. USGS 2024 · reserves as of 2023

not available

● Mined — where it is dug up today

Mining is where ore leaves the ground — the stage most people equate with “the source”, though it is rarely where the supply risk actually concentrates. Output is concentrated: 🇨🇳 China supplies 73%, with 🇷🇺 Russia (7%) next. That is effectively a single-country dependence — one government's policy or one region's disruption can move the entire upstream. USGS 2024 · 2023 production

● Refined / processed — where it becomes usable metal

Refining / processing converts ore into the metal or compound buyers actually purchase; it concentrates in fewer hands than mining and sits at the buyer's doorstep, which is why it is usually the true chokepoint. 🇨🇳 China processes 79% — highly concentrated. China leads both mining and refining, so its grip is structural rather than a pure processing gate. On the buffers: 0% of supply is recovered from end-of-life recycling and substitutes are scarce, while the US imports <50% of what it consumes. USGS MCS 2024

● Recycling & substitutability — the mitigants (EU CRM)

0% of supply comes from recycling end-of-life products — there is essentially no end-of-life recycling, so a disruption has no secondary cushion. Substitutability is high — few or no alternatives, so a disruption bites hard.

● Traded — who ships it

Actual bilateral trade of the traded form, reconciled from UN Comtrade / CEPII BACI. Pick a year below — 2018–2024 measured, 2025* nowcast, 2026** directional scenario. The full 2002–2026 range is on the interactive atlas.

Context

A critical material where the EU is genuinely diversified: origin is Norway (~47%), Brazil and Iceland - not a dependency risk. The naive view still misleads (Germany 44%), but the honest finding here is 'no concentration'. Included to show the method measures rather than confirms.

Every figure on this page is computed from out/data.json and out/flows_2024.json by build_profiles.py — no hand-entered numbers.