Critical Materials Atlas
Critical material · profile · CN 2822 00 00

Cobalt oxides & hydroxides

Exported mainly by Finland (29% of world trade), which mines almost none of it — the source is Congo [DRC] (74% of mine output). The origin gap: +29 points.

52/100
supply-risk index
48 yr
reserve life (reserves ÷ mining)
⚗ by-product
of copper & nickel
67%
US import reliance
🇨🇩 Congo [DRC]
lead reserves · 55%
🇨🇩 Congo [DRC]
lead miner · 74%
🇨🇳 China
lead refiner · 82%
🇫🇮 Finland
top exporter · 29%
0.18
export concentration (HHI)

Primary uses. lithium-ion battery cathodes; superalloys for aerospace engines; catalysts.

⚗ A by-product, not a primary metal. Cobalt oxides & hydroxides is not mined for its own sake — it is recovered as a by-product of copper & nickel. So its supply tracks the copper & nickel market, not its own price: a shortage can’t quickly pull more out of the ground, because miners dig for copper & nickel, not for this. That inelastic supply is a core, often-missed supply-risk driver.
The origin gap. Cobalt oxides & hydroxides is exported mainly by 🇫🇮 Finland (29% of world trade) but mined mainly in 🇨🇩 Congo [DRC] (74%), while Finland mines almost none of it. Taken at face value, import-origin statistics point to Finland as the source; one layer upstream, the real dependence is on Congo [DRC]. Gap: +29 points.
Finland’s share of world cobalt oxides & hydroxides exports, 2002–2024: 27% → 29%

The chain — from the ground to the buyer

A critical material passes through distinct stages, and the country that leads each stage is often different — that gap is what this atlas exists to show. Each layer comes from a different public source with its own vintage, labelled below; shares are % of the world total.

● Reserves — where it could come from

Reserves are the deposits known to exist and economically worth mining — the long-run ceiling on supply, distinct from what is actually produced today. Cobalt oxides & hydroxides's reserves are moderately concentrated: 🇨🇩 Congo [DRC] holds the most (55%), ahead of 🇦🇺 Australia (15%) and 🇨🇺 Cuba (5%). At today's extraction rate the known reserves would last roughly 48 years, so scarcity is not the binding constraint — access, capital and processing capacity are. USGS 2024 · reserves as of 2023

🇨🇩 Congo [DRC]55%
🇦🇺 Australia15%
🇨🇺 Cuba5%
🇮🇩 Indonesia5%
🇵🇭 Philippines2%
🇷🇺 Russia2%
🇨🇦 Canada2%
🌍 Others (not detailed)14%

● Mined — where it is dug up today

Mining is where ore leaves the ground — the stage most people equate with “the source”, though it is rarely where the supply risk actually concentrates. Output is highly concentrated: 🇨🇩 Congo [DRC] supplies 74%, with 🇮🇩 Indonesia (7%) next. That is effectively a single-country dependence — one government's policy or one region's disruption can move the entire upstream. BGS World Mineral Statistics · mine production, 2000–2024 (USGS-validated)

year2023
🇨🇩 Congo [DRC]69%
🇮🇩 Indonesia11%
🇷🇺 Russia4%
🇦🇺 Australia3%
🇨🇦 Canada3%
🇵🇭 Philippines2%
🇵🇬 Papua New Guinea2%
🇲🇬 Madagascar2%
🇨🇺 Cuba2%
🌍 Others (not detailed)2%

● Refined / processed — where it becomes usable metal

Refining / processing converts ore into the metal or compound buyers actually purchase; it concentrates in fewer hands than mining and sits at the buyer's doorstep, which is why it is usually the true chokepoint. 🇨🇳 China processes 82% — highly concentrated. So although 🇨🇩 Congo [DRC] mines the most, China controls processing: the dependency the mine map hides, and the reason import-origin statistics misread the real source. On the buffers: 22% of supply is recovered from end-of-life recycling and substitutes are scarce, while the US imports 67% of what it consumes. BGS World Mineral Statistics 2024

year2023
🇨🇳 China80%
🇫🇮 Finland6%
🇨🇦 Canada3%
🇦🇺 Australia2%
🇯🇵 Japan2%
🇳🇴 Norway2%
🇲🇬 Madagascar2%
🌍 Others (not detailed)3%

● Recycling & substitutability — the mitigants (EU CRM)

22% of supply comes from recycling end-of-life products — a meaningful secondary source that lowers the supply-risk score. Substitutability is high — few or no alternatives, so a disruption bites hard.

● Traded — who ships it

Actual bilateral trade of the traded form, reconciled from UN Comtrade / CEPII BACI. Pick a year below — 2018–2024 measured, 2025* nowcast, 2026** directional scenario. The full 2002–2026 range is on the interactive atlas.

year2024
Top exporters — reconciled trade, 2024
Countrysharevaluetonnes$/t
🇫🇮 Finland29%$140M7.6 kt$18,376/t
🇨🇳 China19%$92M4.7 kt$19,762/t
🇿🇲 Zambia17%$80M9.4 kt$8,533/t
🇨🇩 Congo [DRC]14%$69M8.0 kt$8,620/t
🇧🇪 Belgium12%$60M2.7 kt$21,996/t
🇬🇧 United Kingdom3%$15M737 t$20,764/t
Top importers — reconciled trade, 2024
Countrysharevaluetonnes$/t
🇿🇦 South Africa16%$79M9.3 kt$8,527/t
🇰🇷 South Korea16%$77M4.3 kt$17,970/t
🇿🇲 Zambia14%$67M7.8 kt$8,672/t
🇧🇪 Belgium13%$62M3.4 kt$17,942/t
🇺🇸 United States8%$39M1.9 kt$20,225/t
🇩🇪 Germany5%$27M1.2 kt$23,084/t

Context

The refined-cobalt dependency (the metal alone is diversified): China refines ~62% of the EU's cobalt-oxide imports - the battery-cathode precursor. The naive view blames Belgium (~43%, Umicore's refining/clearing hub); the refined-product origin is China, while the MINE origin is DR Congo (~76% of world cobalt mining) - the trade ledger shows the refiner, not the mine.

Explore cobalt oxides & hydroxides in the atlas → The origin gap Methodology

Every figure on this page is computed from out/data.json and out/flows_2024.json by build_profiles.py — no hand-entered numbers.