Antimony, unwrought

Primary uses. flame retardant synergists; lead-acid battery grids; military munitions.

The chain — from the ground to the buyer

A critical material passes through distinct stages, and the country that leads each stage is often different — that gap is what this atlas exists to show. Each layer comes from a different public source with its own vintage, labelled below; shares are % of the world total.

● Reserves — where it could come from

Reserves are the deposits known to exist and economically worth mining — the long-run ceiling on supply, distinct from what is actually produced today. Antimony's reserves are broadly diversified: 🇺🇸 United States holds the most (29%), ahead of 🇨🇳 China (22%) and 🇷🇺 Russia (12%). At today's extraction rate the known reserves would last roughly 24 years, so the horizon is genuinely finite, so recycling and new discoveries will decide long-run supply. Tellingly, the country sitting on the most ore (🇺🇸 United States) is not the one extracting it (🇨🇳 China) — geology sets the ceiling, but capacity and policy decide who actually supplies the market. USGS 2024 · reserves as of 2023

● Mined — where it is dug up today

Mining is where ore leaves the ground — the stage most people equate with “the source”, though it is rarely where the supply risk actually concentrates. Output is moderately concentrated: 🇨🇳 China supplies 48%, with 🇹🇯 Tajikistan (25%) next. It out-produces reserve-richer 🇺🇸 United States while holding just 22% of reserves itself — supply power at this stage is built on installed capacity, not geology. And the tap is politically live: China export controls (Sep 2024). BGS World Mineral Statistics · mine production, 2000–2024 (USGS-validated)

● Refined / processed — where it becomes usable metal

Refining / processing converts ore into the metal or compound buyers actually purchase; it concentrates in fewer hands than mining and sits at the buyer's doorstep, which is why it is usually the true chokepoint. 🇨🇳 China processes 75% — highly concentrated. China leads both mining and refining, so its grip is structural rather than a pure processing gate. This leverage is not hypothetical — China export controls (Sep 2024). On the buffers: 28% of supply is recovered from end-of-life recycling and substitutes are only partial, while the US imports 82% of what it consumes. leading refiner only — fuller breakdown not publicly reported

● Recycling & substitutability — the mitigants (EU CRM)

28% of supply comes from recycling end-of-life products — a meaningful secondary source that lowers the supply-risk score. Substitutability is medium — partial substitutes exist.

● Traded — who ships it

Actual bilateral trade of the traded form, reconciled from UN Comtrade / CEPII BACI. Pick a year below — 2018–2024 measured, 2025* nowcast, 2026** directional scenario. The full 2002–2026 range is on the interactive atlas.

Context

The method's acid test: the naive view says France and Belgium (~37% each); the corrected view reveals Tajikistan at ~69%, with China barely present. Proof this is not a China-finding machine - it surfaces whatever origin the transit data hides.

Every figure on this page is computed from out/data.json and out/flows_2024.json by build_profiles.py — no hand-entered numbers.